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The Decline of Tenure: The Sixth Circuit's Interpretation of Academic Tenure's Substantive 
Protections 
John M. Badagliacca* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Academic tenure has played an instrumental role in shaping higher education in America 
over the past century. In the most basic sense, academic tenure provides job security to 
employees in the academic field after a specified probationary period. 1 William Van Alstyne, an 
American law professor, provides a helpful definition in his defense of tenure: "[t]enure, 
accurately and unequivocally defined, lays no claim whatever to a guarantee of lifetime 
employment. Rather, tenure provides only that no person continuously retained as a full-time 
faculty member beyond a specified lengthy period of probationary service may thereafter be 
dismissed without adequate cause. "2 Van Alstyne's definition is important because it 
emphasizes one of the crucial aspects of academic tenure---employee dismissal for "adequate 
cause."3 
Tenure provides both substantive and procedural protections to the tenured employee. 
The substantive protections prevent unlawful dismissal, that is, dismissal without adequate cause, 
while the procedural protections ensure that employers follow a certain process during the 
employment and dismissal of tenured employees. Academic tenure also includes the concept of 
"academic freedom," or the ability of professors to teach material in the way they see fit without 
*J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2011, College of the Holy Cross. I would like to 
thank Professor Charles Sullivan and my editor Chris Rojao for their helpful insights and edits on this Comment. I 
also owe many thanks to Professor Lee Oser and Joseph Plukas for guiding me throughout college. Finally, I would 
like to express my sincere gratitude to my family and friends for their support and encouragement throughout law 
school and beyond. 
1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 403 (1993). 
2 William Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and "Defense," 57 AAUP BULL 328 (1971) (emphasis in 
original). 
3 Throughout the history of academic tenure scholars, courts, lawyers, and others have used the term "adequate 
cause" intermittently with "just cause" and "good cause." For this Comment, all three phrases mean the same thing: 
the cause needed to properly dismiss a tenured professor. 
worrying about the pressures of censorship or overt administrative restriction. This Comment 
will analyze the rights provided by academic tenure, and discuss the history and the reasoning for 
the adoption of academic tenure in American colleges and universities. 
This Comment will discuss whether tenure, as an academic and legal concept, affords 
professors specific rights outside of their employment contracts, or in the alternative, whether 
tenure is an abstract concept that simply affords professors more freedom in their pedagogical 
philosophies while providing no legal authority for continuous employment outside of their 
employment contracts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit chose the latter 
in its interpretation of academic tenure in Branham v. Thomas M Cooley Law Schoo/.4 Lynn 
Branham was a tenured law professor at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School who was terminated 
in December 2006.5 The court ruled that Branham's tenure status did not afford her any specific 
rights beyond those set forth in her employment contract. 6 
This Comment argues that the concept of academic tenure in American higher education 
today implicitly affords tenured professors procedural and substantive protections from 
termination. These protections exist as tools to ensure that professors' academic freedom will 
remain uninhibited after a probationary period in which the professors earn the right to their 
protections. In Branham, the Sixth Circuit separated the job security aspect of academic tenure 
from the academic freedom aspect, and treated tenure as a purely pedagogical concept. This 
interpretation reduces tenure to an almost meaningless legal concept that affords no real 
employment protections. The concepts of tenure as a grant of job security and tenure as a grant 
of academic freedom are not mutually exclusive; they are interdependently linked. One cannot 
exist without the other. This interdependent concept of tenure allows the educational system to 
4 689 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2012). 
5 !d. at 561. 
6 !d. at 562. 
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progress, and to divide this concept is to endanger the very system it was designed to protect. 
For these reasons the Sixth Circuit erred in its interpretation of tenure. 
This Comment will take an analytical approach to understand the meaning of academic 
tenure and will serve as both a discussion of the legal interpretation of tenure and as a defense of 
tenure in American higher education. Part II of this Comment will set forth the history of tenure 
in American higher education. It will examine the evolution of tenure, the standards set forth by 
academic and legal organizations, and the industry standards in American higher education. Part 
III will discuss the Branham case and its holding. Part IV will address the nationwide 
implications of the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of tenure and set forth the argument that 
Branham's tenure provided legal authority for her job security regardless of the one-year 
duration of her most recent employment contract. It will also discuss the effect of the Branham 
ruling on professors' future job security and on their ability to exercise academic freedom. 
Finally, Part V will examine the contemporary opinions on tenure in American higher education 
in relation to the Branham ruling. 
II. HISTORY OF TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 
The history of specific legal protection for scholars can be traced back to twelfth-century 
Europe. 7 In 1158, Emperor Frederick Barbarossa8 issued the Authentica Habita, an edict that 
7 Walter P. Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay, in FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 93, 94 (1973) [hereinafter 
Metzger, Academic Tenure in America]. 
8 Frederick I Barbarossa was a German-born Holy Roman Emperor who ruled from 1152-1190, and is widely 
considered one of the most influential figures of his time. MEDIEVAL GERMANY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 380 (John M. 
Jeep ed., 2001). Barbarossa's reign represented a highpoint of German power, and his influence on the German 
people remained long after his death: 
[The Empire's] territory had been wider under Charles, its strength perhaps greater under Henry 
III; but it never appeared in such pervading vivid activity, never shone with such lustre of chivalry, 
as under the prince whom his countrymen have taken to be one of their national heroes, and who is 
still, as the mythic type of Teutonic character, honoured by picture and statue, in song and in 
legend, through the breadth of the German lands. JAMES BRYCE, THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE 72 
(1864). 
3 
promised scholars safe passage in their travels, protection from attack upon their homes, and 
compensation for unlawful injury.9 This twelfth-century edict shows how even hundreds of years 
ago western civilization understood the need to afford certain protections to those who pursued 
scholarly work and who would in tum pass on their knowledge to the next generation. Special 
protection for educators, however, did not become a part of the American educational system 
until relatively recently. Tenure did not reach American schools until the later half of the 
nineteenth century, and the modem concept of academic tenure did not exist until the beginning 
of the twentieth century. 10 The concept of tenure took time to develop in the United States, and 
did not emerge as a fundamental doctrine of American education until the oldest institutions of 
higher learning were forced to adapt to the progressive academic movement at the tum of the 
twentieth century. 11 
A. Origins of Tenure in the United States 
In early nineteenth-century America, colleges anchored themselves in tradition. By 
centering themselves in tradition, American colleges were paternalistic, authoritarian, and 
extremely skeptical of youth. 12 Institutions of higher education focused on the importance of 
Christianity, classical studies, and discipline. 13 This pedagogical mindset left very little room for 
intellectual creativity. 14 At that time, professorial appointments usually lasted indefinitely and 
continued as long as the professor exhibited good behavior.15 Although these indefinite 
appointments existed, there was no legal precedent to support the presumption that the professor 
Barbarossa's edict undoubtedly influenced later German concepts regarding special protections for scholars and 
academics. See infra text accompanying notes 21-27. 
9 Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 94. 
10 WALTER P. METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY 4-5 (1955). 
II /d. 
12 !d. 
13 !d. 
14 !d. 
15 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE COLLEGE 230 (1955). 
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should be allowed to continue his employment absent adequate cause for dismissal. 16 As a 
result, the professor could be fired at will in many institutions without any procedural 
protections. 17 The courts, not wanting to get involved in universities' administrative decisions, 
allowed university boards to govern themselves regarding faculty hiring and firing decisions. 18 
All appointments were, in a legal sense, temporary and instantly extinguishable. 19 The norms 
and standards regarding professorial employment also varied from school to school, and the 
standards of any given university depended largely on its location and the people in charge.20 
While academic tenure as a legal concept was unclear and undefined in America during 
the nineteenth century, the time marked the beginning of a cultural infusion that would reshape 
American thoughts on academic freedom. In the nineteenth century over nine thousand 
Americans studied in German universities.21 These returning students, along with German 
scholars teaching in the United States at the time, assimilated German methods and ideals into 
American higher education. 22 One of the most important ideals that Germans brought to the 
United States was the concept of lehrfreiheit, which roughly translates to "teaching freedom," 
and encompasses what we now call "academic freedom."23 
Particularly, the concept of lehrfreiheit meant two things: (1) that a university professor 
was free to perform his own research and to report his findings through publication or lecture; 
16 Id 
17 Id 
18 Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 133. 
19 James J. Fishman, Tenure and Its Discontents: The Worst Form of Employment Relationship Save All of the 
Others, 21 PACE L. REv. 159, 164 (2000). 
20 Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 135. 
21 METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 10, at 93. 
22 !d. The German concept of giving professors and scholars specific protections traces all the way back to Emperor 
Barbarossa's Authentica Habita. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying texts. 
23 Gregory M. Dickinson, Academic Tenure and the Divide between Legal Academia and Legal Practice, 6 
DARTMOUTH L.J. 318,329 (2008). 
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and (2) that the professor enjoyed the freedom of teaching and freedom of inquiry?4 The 
Germans did not believe that adherence to lehrfreiheit was a voluntary choice for universities: 
"[t]his freedom was not, as the Germans conceived it ... a superadded attraction of certain 
universities and not of others; rather, it was the distinctive prerogative of the academic 
profession, and the essential condition of all universities."25 Lehrfreiheit also promoted the 
concept of limited administrative rules within the education system.26 Therefore, the German 
idea of academic freedom entailed the right of professors to teach without fear of dismissal, and 
promoted an atmosphere of administrative leniency surrounding the teaching process?7 
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the professoriate began organizing into 
specialized departments reflecting national specialist organizations.28 This created a more 
specialized faculty comprised of research scholars who could best be evaluated by their 
disciplinary peers rather than by administrators or lay trustees.29 After this shift, universities 
were only a short step away from adopting the belief that faculty should be involved in a quasi-
judicial proceeding to determine whether another faculty member should be dismissed.30 This 
new specialized faculty brought with it a conflict between professors and administrators. 31 The 
more the professors explored and critiqued their own specialized field--delving into 
controversial topics and ideas-the angrier the administrators became.32 The divergence of 
traditional views in academia had previously been easy grounds for dismissal, but the turn-of-
24 METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 10, at I 12-13. 
25 Id at I 13. 
26 Id 
27 Id 
28 Fishman, supra note 19, at 164. These organizations were tailored to specific disciplines. Id For example, 
history professors became part of the newly formed American Historical Association. !d. The American professor 
now belonged to a broad professional group (the faculty) and a narrower professional group within a specific 
discipline. !d. 
29 Dickinson, supra note 23, at 330. 
3° Fishman, supra note 19, at 165. 
31 Dickinson, supra note 23, at 330. 
"Id 
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the-century technological advances and the philosophical shifts of the era resulted in a different 
outlook towards progressive academic thought.33 It became apparent that to continue the 
progressiOn of the era, institutions of higher learning needed to promote greater academic 
freedom. 34 As the economy demanded highly trained scientists due to the technological 
advances of the industrial revolution, universities sought out skilled specialists to provide their 
students with the proper education.35 In turn, these highly skilled professors demanded a great 
level of academic autonomy in order to advance the sciences.36 University leaders began 
publicly embracing the protection of progressive academic thought at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.37 In the 1907 commencement address, Harvard president Charles W. Eliot 
said: 
[S]o long as ... boards of trustees of colleges and universities 
claim the right to dismiss at pleasure all the officers of the 
institutions in their charge, there will be no security for the 
teachers' proper freedom . . . . [I]t is easy for a department to 
become despotic, particularly if there be one dominant personage 
in it.38 
Eliot's statement was one of the first to link academic freedom with the goal of avoiding 
administrative interference with faculty positions.39 At the time of Eliot's commencement 
address, the American university was uprooting itself from its authoritarian past, allowing an 
opportunity for the modern tenure system to take hold.40 
B. TheAAUP 
33 Id at 331. 
34 Id 
35 Id 
36 Id 
37 See, e.g., METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 10, at 124. 
38 !d. 
39 Dickinson, supra note 23, at 331. 
40 This tenure movement gained momentum in the early twentieth century, but still took time to develop: in 1913 a 
Wesleyan professor was dismissed for giving a speech in which he urged less rigid observance of the Sabbath. See 
Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 146. 
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In 1900, Stanford University dismissed economics professor Edward A. Ross from his 
position due to his political and social views.41 Jane Lathrop Stanford, the widow of Stanford 
University's founder Leland Stanford, was the sole trustee of the university at the time.42 Upon 
hearing about Ross's views, Stanford dismissed him.43 Arthur Oncken Lovejoy, an associate 
professor at Stanford, resigned in protest of Ross's dismissal 44 In 1913 Lovejoy, along with 
eighteen professors from Johns Hopkins University, wrote a letter to colleagues at other leading 
universities asking them to join in the formation of a national association of professors.45 The 
purpose of the association was to protect the institutional interests of faculty, specifically through 
the creation of general principles regarding tenure and the legitimate dismissal of faculty. 46 
The Hopkins letter was well-received by professors around the country and the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) was established in 1915.47 The AAUP modeled 
itself after the American Bar Association in order to promote its desire to serve as a link between 
professionalism and academic freedom.48 In the same year of its establishment, the AAUP 
issued the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure.49 The 
report championed three elements of academic freedom: "freedom of inquiry and research, 
freedom of teaching within the university or college, and freedom of extramural utterance and 
action."50 In 1940, the AAUP, in coordination with the Association of American Colleges 
41 Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 138. 
42 Jd. 
43 Jd. 
44 Jd. at 135. 
45 !d. 
46 Fishman, supra note 19, at 166. 
47 METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 10, at 194. 
48 Fishman, supra note 19, at 167. 
49 See General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, I AAUP BULL. 291 (1915), 
available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/ A6520A9D-OA9A-47B3-B550-
C006B5B224E7 /0/1915Declaration.pdf [hereinafter I 9 I 5 Declaration]. 
50 !d. at 292. 
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(AAC), released a new statement of principles. 51 The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure ("1940 Statement") received widespread endorsement and became one of 
the most influential of all such formularies. 52 
The 1940 Statement defined tenure as a means to two specific ends: "(!) freedom of 
teaching and research and of extramural activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic 
security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability."53 With the new goals of 
tenure set forth, the AAUP then labeled freedom and economic security as "indispensible to the 
success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society."54 The 1940 
Statement further demanded that, after a probationary period, teachers should have permanent or 
continuous tenure. 55 After achieving tenure, the professor could not be terminated except for 
adequate cause. 56 One of the shortcomings of the 1940 Statement was its failure to clearly define 
adequate cause, providing only "an oblique reference to moral turpitude and a suggestion as to 
how incompetence should be judged."57 The 1940 Statement also sets forth an early framework 
for the procedural rights afforded to tenured professors: "[t]ermination for cause of a continuous 
appointment, or the dismissal for cause of a teacher previous to the expiration of a term 
appointment, should, if possible, be considered by both a faculty committee and the governing 
board of the institution. "58 
51 Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 152; 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom 
and Tenure, AAUP POLICY TENTH (2d ed.) 3, available at http://www.aaup.org/sites/defaultlfiles/principles-
academic-freedom-tenure.pdf [hereinafter 1940 Statement of Principles]. 
52 Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 152. 
53 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 51, at 3. 
54 !d. 
55 !d. at 4. 
56 !d. 
57 Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7, at 152 n.91. 
58 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 51, at 4. 
9 
In 1958, the AAUP and AAC collaborated again to release a more detailed and stringent 
policy on the procedural standards for dismissals. 59 This new policy stated that when the first 
reasons arise to question the fitness of a tenured faculty member, the administrative officer 
should first seek a personal conference with the faculty member. 60 The faculty member may 
then request a hearing in order to determine whether he should be removed from the faculty 
position on the grounds stated. 61 The faculty member had the right to counsel, to question all 
witnesses who testify orally, and to be confronted by all adverse witnesses.62 In addition, there 
must be a record of all of the evidence against the professor. 63 
Since 1957, the AAUP has continuously released and revised a policy document titled 
Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure ("Recommended 
Regulations").64 The document reflects the development of AAUP standards and procedures, 
and the most recent revision is from 2009.65 The opening lines of the recommended regulations 
state its purpose to "protect academic freedom and tenure and to ensure academic due process. "66 
The Recommended Regulations specifically point out that dismissals of all forms of faculty 
members will not be a means of curbing academic freedom: "[a]dequate cause for a dismissal 
will be related, directly and substantially, to the fitness of faculty members in their professional 
capacities as teachers or researchers. Dismissal will not be used to restrain faculty members in 
59 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, AAUP POLICY TENTH (2d ed.) 12, 
available at http://www.aaup.org/file/standards-faculty-dismissal.pdf [hereinafter I 958 Statement of Principles]. 
60 Jd. at 13. 
61 Jd. 
62 !d. 
63 !d. at 14. 
64 Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, (2009), available at 
http:/ /www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/E45D703 B-OOF 1-4 BC0-9DOA-3 22DF63 A I DO? /0/RIR.pdf [hereinafter 
Recommended Regulations]. 
65 !d. 
66 !d. at I. 
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their exercise of academic freedom or other rights of American citizens. "67 The language of the 
Recommended Regulations shows a conscious effort on the part of the AAUP to defend the idea 
that tenured professors can maintain job security without fear of arbitrary dismissal. Almost one 
hundred years after its inception, the AAUP still champions the protection of academic freedom 
in American institutions, and reinforces that idea in its published works.68 
C. The ABA 
Law schools are a particularly prominent subset of American institutions of higher 
learning. Like some other graduate schools, law schools have the special quality of being linked 
to both the educational world and to the world of a specific and prominent profession. 
Therefore, as members of educational institutions, law professors fall under the protection of the 
standards and regulations of the AUUP.69 But law professors, as members of the legal 
profession, may also find guidance and protection under the standards and regulations of the 
American Bar Association (ABA).70 Every year, the ABA releases its Standards and Rules of 
Procedure for Approval of Law Schools ("ABA Standards"). 71 The main purpose of the 
publication is to set forth the requirements law schools must meet in order to obtain and retain 
ABA approval. 72 ABA accreditation is important because in most states, one must have attended 
an ABA accredited school in order to sit for the bar exam.73 Attending an ABA accredited 
67 /dat4. 
68 See generally AM. Ass'N OF U. PROFESSORS, http://www.aaup.org (last visited Mar. 12 2013). 
69 Id 
70 See ABA, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROC. FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, vii (2012), available at 
http://www .americaubar.org/content/darn/aba!publications/rnisc/legal_ education/Standards/20 12 _ 20 13 _ aba _ staudar 
ds _ aud _rules.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. 
71/d 
72 /d 
73 For more information on the ABA's accreditation and approval of law schools see FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS, http://www .americaubar.org/groups/legal_ education/resources/frequently_ asked_ questions.html. 
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school also ensures that the student will rece1ve a nationally approved program of legal 
education. 74 
The ABA Standards also set forth the standards and requirements that govern law school 
faculty at ABA accredited institutions.75 Standard 405, labeled Professional Environment, states 
that "[a] law school shall have an established and announced policy with respect to academic 
freedom and tenure of which Appendix I herein is an example but is not obligatory."76 Standard 
405 also includes a set of interpretations to explain the standard.77 The explanation of tenure in 
interpretation 405-6 bears a heavy resemblance to the concept of tenure maintained by the 
AAUP: "[a]fter tenure is granted, the faculty member may be terminated only for good cause, 
including termination or material modification of the entire clinical program." 78 Interpretation 
405-6 also grants specific protections to professors with long-term contract agreements. 79 The 
trend and popularity of long-term contracts for faculty members will be discussed in more detail 
in Part IV infra. 
As mentioned above, the ABA Standards provides an example of the tenure policies and 
procedures that accredited law schools must adopt in their appendices. The example given by 
the ABA, labeled Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, is the exact text from the 1940 
Statement issued by the AAUP. 80 The ABA's decision to adopt the AAUP's policies on 
academic freedom and tenure as the template for law schools shows that the ABA acquiesced to 
the AAUP's regulations in matters regarding academic tenure.81 Although the ABA Standards 
74 See id. 
75 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70. 
76 !d. at 32. 
77 !d. at33. 
78 Compare ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 33, with 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 51, at 4. 
79 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 33. 
8
° Compare id. at 161, with 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 51. 
81 The ABA's Statement on Academic Freedom begins with a footnote mentioning that the text of the statement 
follows the AAUP's 1940 Statement of Principles. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 161. 
12 
states that it is not obligatory for law schools to adopt the example given, the ABA's choice to 
use the 1940 Statement as its tenure policy template is clearly an endorsement of the AAUP's 
policies. 82 
D. Current Tenure Statistics 
The National Center for Education Statistics reported that in the fall of2010, 46% of full-
time professionals employed at post-secondary schools (including law schools and other 
professional schools, but excluding medical schools) had faculty status.83 The report further 
states that 21% of all full-time professionals had tenure, meaning 45.6% of employees with 
faculty status had tenure.84 Another 17.4% of faculty employees were on a tenure track, while 
only 15.2% of full-time faculty belonged to post-secondary schools without a tenure system.85 
This data shows that a vast majority of colleges and universities across the country utilize some 
form of tenure system. In those schools, over half of the full time faculty members have tenure 
status or are on a tenure track. Tenure is a major part of American education, and any change to 
the substantive tenure doctrine will have serious implications for the institutions and professors 
participating in some form of tenure system.86 Thus, academic tenure's ability to ensure 
academic freedom must be protected or else true academic freedom in American institutions of 
higher learning will begin to disappear. 
III. THE BRANHAM DECISION 
In August 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed 
whether a professor's tenure status afforded her any specific rights outside of her current 
82 Id 
83 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, EMPLOYEES IN POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS, FALL 2010, AND 
SALARIES OF FULL-TIME INSTRUCTIONAL STAFF, 2010-11, at 3 (2011), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs20 12/20 1227 6.pdf. 
84 !d. 
85 ld 
,.,d 
13 
employment contract in Branham v. Thomas M Cooley Law School.87 The Sixth Circuit 
ultimately held that Branham's tenure status did not grant her any rights other than those 
enumerated in her individual employment contract for the most recent year. 88 The ruling set a 
precedent against the legal significance of tenure status and bolstered the importance of 
employment contracts for graduate professors. 
Thomas M. Cooley Law School hired Lynn Branham as a criminal law professor in 
1983.89 On December 21, 2005, Branham signed an employment contract for a twelve-month 
employment period beginning on January 1, 2006.90 Branham's employment contract contained 
a section labeled "Rank and Title" which read: "The Professor shall hold the rank and title of 
TENURED PROFESSOR OF LAW with all the rights and privileges thereof, as defined in the 
Bylaws of the School or as may from time to time be conferred by the Board ofDirectors."91 In 
the section labeled "General Provisions," the employment contract expressly incorporated certain 
ABA standards: "The current provisions of the American Bar Association standards governing 
approval of law schools as they relate to maximum teaching loads and other rights, duties, and 
prerogatives of faculty members shall be and become part of this contract by reference 
thereto."92 Branham's employment contract also expressly incorporated Cooley's Policy 201-
the law school's policy regarding academic rank and tenure.93 
In the Spring Semester 2006, Branham taught Constitutional Law and Torts.94 Branham 
completed the semester without a problem although she expressed displeasure with the school 
87 689 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 20 12). The Sixth Circuit subsequently denied a rehearing and a rehearing en bane. !d. 
88 !d. at 563. 
89 !d. at 561. 
90 Id. 
91 Emp't Contract at 12, Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 1:07-CV-630 (W.O. Mich. Mar. 16, 2009), 
20 I 0 WL 3505930. 
92 !d. at 15. 
93 Branham, at 562; see infra text accompanying note 104. 
94 !d. at 561. 
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administration for not assigning her any criminal law-related courses.95 In the Fall Semester 
2006 she was again assigned to teach Constitutional Law, which she refused to teach. 96 Instead, 
she requested an assignment to teach a course related to criminallaw.97 In December 2006, after 
Branham refused to teach her assigned course, Cooley dismissed Branham from her position.98 
Branham's employment contract required Cooley to put Branham's dismissal to a faculty vote 
before the dismissal could be final. 99 Cooley failed to follow this procedure, and there was no 
faculty vote concerning Branham's dismissal. 100 
Upon her dismissal, Branham filed a complaint for wrongful dismissal for breach of 
contract against Cooley in federal court. 101 The District Court for the Western District of 
Michigan concluded that Cooley had breached the employment contract by not following the 
dismissal process required by the contract. 102 The court then ordered Cooley to comply with that 
process. 103 Cooley's Policy 201 states: 
95 Id 
96 !d. 
97 Id 
98 Id 
No tenured faculty member shall be dismissed . . . prior to the 
expiration of the term of his appointment, except for good cause 
shown and in accordance with the following procedure: 
(a) Notice in writing by the dean of the reasons and grounds for 
dismissal shall be served on the faculty member at least 
fourteen days prior to a meeting of the faculty conference at 
which the removal is to be considered, as provided in 
subparagraph (b) herein. 
(b) The Dean shall thereafter cause a meeting of the faculty 
conference to be convened for the purpose of considering 
removal of the faculty member. 
99 Branham, 689 F.3d at 561. 
100 Id 
101/d 
102 Id 
103 Id 
15 
(c) If the faculty conference shall concur in removal, the faculty 
member shall be removed, subject to appeal to the academic 
committee of the Board of Directors. 104 
In accordance with the court's decision, Cooley held a faculty conference to debate whether 
adequate cause existed to dismiss Branham. 105 The faculty concurred with Cooley's decision to 
dismiss Branham, and the district court then ruled that Cooley had complied with the procedural 
requirements set forth in Branham's employment contract. 106 Although the district court found 
that Cooley had originally violated the procedural requirements regarding Branham's dismissal, 
the court went on to rule that the tenure granted under Branham's contract did not afford her 
rights beyond those specified in her employment contract. 107 Branham appealed the district 
court's decision, bringing the issue to the Sixth Circuit. 
A. The Sixth Circuit's Analysis in Branham 
On appeal, Branham argued that her status as a tenured professor granted her a lifetime 
appointment or a guarantee of continuous employment. 108 She believed that the court should 
have incorporated the ABA's suggested tenure policies into her employment contract and used 
those policies to interpret the rights and protections she had regarding her employment status.' 09 
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis of the issue by examining Michigan contract law and 
finding that "contacts for permanent employment are for an indefinite period of time and are 
presumptively construed to provide employment at will."110 Branham's contract was a twelve-
104 /d. at 563. 
105 Branham, 689 F.3d at 561. 
106 /d. After the district court ordered Cooley to conduct the faculty conference, the school issued Branham a written 
notification of the reasons for her dismissal. /d. at 563. The faculty members at the conference voted 85-19 in 
favor of Branham's dismissal. /d. The district court ruled that Cooley's actions satisfied the procedural 
requirements for dismissal even though the faculty conference took place years after Branham's original dismissal. 
/d. 
107 /d. at 562. 
108 ld. 
109 /d. 
110 Ed. at 562 (quoting Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 437 Mich. 627, 473 (1991)). 
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month employment contract. 111 Therefore, under Michigan contract law, Branham's contract 
was not a contract for permanent employment unless a specific provision of the contract granted 
her employment for an indefinite period of time outside of the twelve-month agreement. 112 
Importantly, the court did not find that Branham's tenure status, which was expressly 
incorporated into the contract, granted her indefinite employment. 113 
The first step the Sixth Circuit took in its analysis was to define the exact rights 
Branham's tenure status provided her as a professor at Cooley. 114 Due to the employment 
contract's express incorporation of the ABA standards governing approval of law schools, the 
court looked to ABA Standard 405 in order to interpret the scope of Branham's tenure rights.ns 
Standard 405 states that "[a] law school shall have an established and announced policy with 
respect to academic freedom and tenure .... "116 The ABA provides a model tenure standard, 
which, as mentioned in Part II supra, is the same standard as the model standard adopted by the 
AAUP's 1940 Statement. 117 The Sixth Circuit reviewed the 1940 Statement but concluded that 
since the ABA that articulated the statement "is an example but is not obligatory," the tenure 
standard set forth by the statement was not necessarily the tenure that Branham heldll 8 The 
court then took its analysis a step further and concluded that even if the tenure rights outlined in 
the 1940 Statement were the exact rights incorporated into Branham's contract, the tenure held 
by Branham still did not afford her any special rights beyond those enumerated in her contract. 119 
1
" Emp't Contract, supra note 91, at 12. 
"
2 Branham, 689 F.3d at 562. 
113 I d. at 563. 
114 I d. at 562. 
liS Id. 
"
6 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 32. 
117 See id. at 33. 
118 Branham, at 562. 
119 Id. 
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The court reached its conclusion due to a narrow reading of the 1940 Statement. The 
1940 Statement reads "teachers ... should have permanent or continuous tenure," prompting the 
court to find that it was merely a suggestion, and not a requirement, that law schools grant 
· 
120 Th fi b . . . h I permanent or contmuous tenure. ere ore, a sent any prov1s1on m t e contract express y 
defining Branham's tenure as permanent or continuous employment, the court found that the 
language of the contract did not grant any form of permanent employment, and that Branham 
only had a contract for a twelve-month period of employment. 121 The Sixth Circuit posited that 
the tenure to which Branham's contract referred might have meant that she had academic 
freedom, and that Cooley generally expected to enter into new employment contracts with her 
each year, but that Branham was not guaranteed continuous employment through her tenure 
status or her employment contract. 122 After the court completed its analysis of Branham's 
substantive tenure rights it affirmed the district court's ruling that the court-ordered faculty 
conference complied with the procedural rights afforded to Branham under her employment 
contract. 123 
B. The Correct Analysis of Professors' Tenure Rights 
The Sixth Circuit erred by ruling that Branham's tenure did not afford her rights beyond 
those specified in her most recent employment contract. First, the court erroneously concluded 
that only contracts for an indefinite period of time could establish permanent employment.124 
The court supported its reasoning by citing Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., which held that 
contracts for permanent employment are for an indefinite period of time. 125 Thus, since 
120 Id (emphasis added). 
121 Id at 562-63. 
122 !d. at 563. 
123 Id 
124 Branham, 689 F.3d at 562. 
125 Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d. 268 (Mich. 1991). 
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Branham's contract was not for an indefinite period of time, Branham did not enjoy any right to 
permanent employment. 126 
The problem with the court's reliance on Rowe is that Rowe does not address the concept 
of tenure. 127 The plaintiff in Rowe was a saleswoman, not a graduate professor with tenure 
status. 128 The Rowe court did not need to address the issue of any additional employment rights 
such as tenure. 129 Therefore, while the decision that contracts for permanent employment are for 
an indefinite period of time remains good law, it fails to fully cover the issue of Branham's 
substantive tenure rights. The concept of tenure that scholars have promoted throughout history 
is that the tenured professor does not need to rely on contracts in order to maintain permanent 
employment. 130 Tenure is the grant of a permanent employment status. If the only way to 
ensure a prolonged promise of employment is to enter into an employment contract for a 
permanent or lengthy period, then the entire purpose of academic tenure becomes moot. 131 
Multiple courts have found that a professor's tenure status grants him employment rights 
on top of his current employment contract, and that the rights expressly outlined in employment 
contracts do not automatically limit or restrict substantive tenure rights. 132 For example, in 
Collins v. Parsons College, the Supreme Court of Iowa ruled that a professor who was granted 
126 Branham, 689 F.3d at 562. 
127 See Rowe, 473 N.W.2d 268 at 272 (deciding whether an employer's oral statements and written policy statements 
created an indefinite employment contract). 
128 Id at 270. 
129 See id. at 272. 
130 Permanent employment may better be described as indefinite employment with job security. The permanent 
employment that tenured professors maintain is an employment that continues unless there is adequate cause for 
dismissal or the professor decides to leave. Permanent employment granted by tenure status is not a permanent 
contract for employment to which both the school and the professor are bound. It is a contractual option; the school 
is bound to employ the tenured professor year to year (as long as the professor decides to sign the contract), while 
the professor has the option of leaving at his own will at the end of every year. 
131 See generally Ralph S. Brown Jr. & Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and Academic Freedom, 53 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 325 (1990); Metzger, Academic Tenure in America, supra note 7; Van Alstyne, supra note 2. 
132 See, e.g., Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d 194 (Mont. 1981); Collins v. Parsons Coli., 
203 N.W.2d. 594 (Iowa 1973); State ex rei. Richardson v. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. of Nev., 261 P.2d 515 (Nev. 
1953). 
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tenure in a one-year employment contract could be terminated only for just cause and on written 
charges before the faculty. 133 Collins had signed a one-year contract, which labeled him as a 
tenured professor even though the contract did not expressly define tenure. 134 Upon expiration 
of the contract term, the college informed Collins that he would not be employed the following 
year. 135 The college did not allege any adequate cause for its dismissal of Collins or make any 
suggestion that Collins's dismissal was due to his performance. 136 The court ruled that Collins 
"did not waive his right of tenure by executing written contracts carrying out the original 
agreement in individual years."137 Therefore, although Collins entered into an employment 
contract for a period of only one year, he was still entitled to indefinite employment due to his 
tenure status. 138 Additionally, the Collins court was willing to look to the general meaning of 
tenure in order to define what Collins's tenure status entitled him, but did not need to resort to 
that analysis because the school's tenure policies were clearly outlined in its bylaws. 139 
The Supreme Court of Nevada encountered a similar tenure issue in State ex rel. 
Richardson v. Board of Regents of University of Nevada. 140 There, the court found that the 
university's bylaws regarding tenure were binding even if they were not enumerated in the 
professor's individual employment contract. 141 Frank Richardson had been an associ ale 
professor at the University of Nevada for four years when he was dismissed because of alleged 
133 Collins, 203 N.W.2d. at 598. 
134 Id at 596. 
l35 ld 
136 Id at 597. 
137 Id at 598. 
138 Id at 599. 
139 Collins, 203 N.W.2d at 597-98. The court looked at the definition of tenure in Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary: "a status granted usu. after a probationary period to one holding a position esp. as a teacher 
and protecting him form dismissal except for serious misconduct or incompetence determined by formal hearings or 
trial; permanent tenure." Id at 597. 
140 261 P.2d 515 (Nev. 1953). 
141 Id 
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insubordination.142 The university's tenure policy was outlined in a faculty bulletin promulgated 
by the Board of Regents, which stated that upon an associate professor's completion of one year 
of service he could be re-appointed, after which re-appointment "his employment shall continue 
under tenure."143 The bulletin went on to state that a tenured professor may only be dismissed 
for cause. 144 The court makes no mention as to whether the university expressly incorporated the 
tenure policy or Richardson's tenure status in any of the employment contracts Richardson 
signed with the university. 145 Regardless, when the Board of Regents was challenged on its 
jurisdiction regarding Richardson's dismissal, the board argued that its tenure policy was not 
binding and could be ignored whenever the Board saw fit. 146 
The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that the policy was binding, and stated that the rule, 
"having been duly established, has the force and effect of statute," and that it affected all 
"persons holding their positions under contract."147 The University of Nevada had a clear 
statement of its tenure policies, which its Board of Regents endorsed. 148 Therefore, regardless of 
the rights set forth in its employees' contracts, the university had a binding obligation to obey its 
tenure policy, which provided continuous employment to tenured professors. 149 
The issue of the scope of tenure rights outside of the express content of employment 
contracts is not limited to cases where the schools terminated the tenured professor. The 
Supreme Court of Montana ruled on a tenure issue that did not involve termination in Keiser v. 
State Board of Regents of Higher Education. 150 Marjorie Keiser was the Director of the School 
142 Id at 515. 
143 fd at 516 (emphasis added). 
144 Id 
145 Ed at 515. 
146 Richardson, 261 P.2d at 517. 
147 Id at 518. 
148 Id at 516. 
149 Id at 518. 
150 630 P.2d 194 (Mont. 1981). 
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of Home Economics at Montana State University. 151 In 1975, Keiser signed a full academic term 
(twelve-month) employment contract, which stated that she had "continuous" tenure status. 152 
Then, in 1978, the president of the university only offered Keiser a partial academic term (ten-
month) employment contract. 153 All of Keiser's employment contracts had termination clauses 
stating that the school could only terminate a faculty member with continuous tenure if there was 
"adequate cause."154 But "continuous tenure" was not defined in any of Keiser's contracts. 155 
The court looked to the 1940 Statement issued by the AAUP in order to define tenure and 
determined that the goals of tenure were academic freedom and economic security, or the 
promise of indefinite employment. 156 Since economic security was a goal of tenure, the court 
ruled that Keiser and Montana State University had that goal in mind when executing Keiser's 
1975 employment contract, and it ruled that a main ingredient of Keiser's continuous tenure was 
appointment of a full academic term. 157 Therefore, the court found that the reduction in Keiser's 
academic term was a violation of her continuous tenure. 158 Keiser's right to continuous full-term 
employment was not expressly enumerated in any of her employment contracts, but the court in 
Keiser looked outside the contracts to define the scope of Keiser's tenure rights and ultimately 
ruled that her tenure status-undefined in all of her contracts-afforded her a specific set of 
protections. 159 
C. The Correct Interpretation of Branham's Tenure Rights 
151 !d. at 195. 
152 Id at 196. 
153 Jd After the 1975 contract, Keiser signed a new contract year after year with the identical twelve-month 
academic term until 1978 when the university refused to offer her a full term contract. !d. 
154 ld at 198. The contract also allowed for termination if the university found itself in financial exigency. Id This 
Comment does not discuss financial exigency terminations of tenured professors, but certain terminations of tenured 
professors are valid under the financial exigency doctrine. 
155 ld 
156 Keiser, 630 P.2d at 199. 
157 !d. 
158 !d. 
159 ld 
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The Sixth Circuit's ruling in Branham stands in direct contradiction with the ruling in 
Collins. Like Collins, Branham was a tenured professor, which was expressly stated in her 
employment contract. 160 Branham also signed a contract that covered a one-year term of 
employment. 161 The Sixth Circuit should have followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court of 
Iowa in Collins-ruling that while the employment contract only covered a one-year term, the 
professor's tenure status afforded him continuous employment unless adequate cause existed for 
dismissal. 162 
The main difference between Collins and Branham is that in Branham the law school 
most likely had adequate cause to dismiss Branham-her refusal to teach her assigned classes. 163 
But the fact that Cooley had adequate cause to dismiss Branham does not mitigate the error in 
the court's analysis. The court ruled that Branham's tenure status was meaningless beyond the 
agreements set forth in her employment contract, meaning that, even if Cooley lacked adequate 
cause, it had the ability to dismiss Branham free of legal consequence at the expiration of her 
one-year employment contract. 164 That is the exact situation that academic tenure is supposed to 
prevent. 
In Richardson, the university most likely had adequate cause to dismiss the professor 
because of insubordination, but the university tried to skirt its own tenure policies, and the court 
ruled that the policies were binding regardless of the professor's contract.165 In Keiser, the 
160 Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 689 F.3d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 2012). 
161Jd. 
162 Collins v. Parsons Coli., 203 N.W.2d 594, 597-99 (Iowa 1973). 
163 Branham, 689 F.3d at 561. 
164 /d. at 563. 
165 State ex rei. Richardson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nev., 261 P.2d 515, 518 (Nev. 1953). Similar to the facts 
in Branham, the university in Richardson had adequate cause to dismiss the professor, and the school rightfully 
dismissed the professor. !d. at 515 (explaining that Richardson was uncooperative and insubordinate). But the 
Richardson court made sure that the correct procedures were taken during the dismissal in order to ensure that the 
university's tenure rights protected professors in future situations where the university may not have adequate cause 
for dismissal. !d. at 518. 
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professor's tenure status prevented the university from reducing her academic term at the 
. . f h 1 166 exp1ratwn o er emp oyment contract. The scope of the protection that tenure affords 
professors is the core issue at stake in Branham, not the outcome of the professor's employment. 
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit reached the correct outcome: Branham's dismissal was proper.167 
But the court used a flawed rationale in order to reach that outcome, and the ruling that emerged 
as a result of the court's flawed reasoning struck a harsh blow to the doctrine of academic tenure. 
The Branham case is a prime example of a situation where administrative inefficiency 
forced the court to enter into an unnecessary analysis, which resulted in an errant legal ruling. 
Branham's employment contract granted her tenure status but did not define tenure. 168 The 
contract then incorporated the ABA Standards, which provide that "a law school shall have an 
established and announced policy with respect to academic freedom and tenure."169 At that point 
the contract still did not give any definition or explanation as to what Cooley's tenure status 
actually meant. 170 The courts in Collins and Richardson did not have to face this issue.l7l In 
Collins, the court noted that it was unnecessary to delve into a discussion on the meaning of 
tenure because the faculty bylaws at Parsons College specifically stated that a tenured faculty 
member "could be terminated only for just cause, on written charges before the tenured 
faculty." 172 In Richardson, the court went as far as to rule that the university's tenure policy had 
the force of a statute because there was a faculty bulletin, which expressly stated that upon 
reappointment after one year, an associate professor's employment "shall continue under 
166 Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d 194, 199 (Mont. 1981). 
167 Branham, 689 F.3d at 566. 
168 I d. at 562. 
169 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 32. 
170 See Employment Contract, supra note 91, at 15. 
l7l See generally Branham, 689 F.3d 558; Collins v. Parsons Coli., 203 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973). 
172 Collins, 203 N. W.2d at 597-98. 
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tenure." 173 The tenure policies of both institutions clearly provided that tenured professors have 
the right to continuous employment because of their tenure status. 174 Collins and Richardson are 
examples of administrative efficiency. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals illustrated the best example of how administrative 
efficiency can help solve problems by defining tenure in Bruno v. Detroit Institute of 
Technology. 175 In that case, the school dismissed a professor without adequate cause, prompting 
the professor to argue that his dismissal was improper due to his tenure status. 176 The court 
stated, "the answer to this question depends entirely upon the construction given to the language 
of ... defendant's tenure policy."177 After looking to the school's policy, the court found that 
the professor had achieved tenure status, and then sought to determine what that status meant.178 
The school's tenure policy defined tenure as "expectation of continuous appointment until 
retirement, with stipulations that it may be terminated for causes specifically identified in the 
present statement of tenure policy."179 Here, the court looked to the school's policies, found the 
policy on tenure, and made a ruling based on that policy. 180 The Sixth Circuit was unable to 
perform an easy and straightforward analysis like the one in Bruno because Cooley's tenure 
policy was not clearly defined. 181 
The administrative inefficiency found in the Branham case-specifically, the lack of a 
clear definition of tenure in Branham's employment contract or Cooley's school policies-
forced the Sixth Circuit to devise its own interpretation of the scope of Branham's tenure rights. 
173 State ex rei. Richardson v. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. ofNev., 261 P.2d 515, 516 (Nev. 1953). 
174 See Collins, 203 N. W.2d at 597-98; Richardson, 261 P.2d at 516. 
175 512 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974). 
176 I d. at 747. 
m Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 749. 
180 Id. at 747-49. 
181 See Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. 689 F.3d 558,561 (6thCir. 2012). 
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Since Branham's contract expressly incorporated the standards of the ABA, the court looked at 
the ABA's model set of tenure policies-a direct copy of the AAUP's 1940 Statement. 182 The 
1940 Statement defines tenure as a means for economic security and states that professors 
"should have permanent or continuous tenure, and their service should be terminated only for 
adequate cause."183 Despite the 1940 Statement, the court rejected the argument that Cooley 
adopted the ABA's model tenure policy because it found that the policy was merely an example 
for schools and not an obligation that they must follow. 184 
The court then admitted that Cooley's Policy 201 referred to the concept of tenure, but 
did not define it. 185 The lack of a clear definition of tenure in the employment contract or in 
Cooley's policies forced the court to analyze multiple tenure policies set forth by different 
organizations, and the court failed to choose the correct standard that applied to Branham. 
Instead, the Sixth Circuit decided that the ABA/ AAUP policy did not apply-reasoning that the 
policy was merely a model of a tenure policy, and did not necessarily represent the tenure 
Branham held. 186 Thus, no right to continuous employment existed because there was no right to 
continuous employment in the employment contract. 187 The Sixth Circuit further erred by 
claiming that, even if it incorporated the 1940 Statement into the employment contract, Branham 
would still not have been afforded any rights other than those explicitly laid out in her 
contract. 188 The court reached this conclusion by claiming that the statement suggests but does 
not require that law schools grant permanent or continuous tenure. 189 In Collins, Richardson, 
182 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 161; see also I 940 Statement of Principles, supra note 51. 
183 I 940 Statement of Principles, supra note 51, at 4. 
184 Branham, 689 N.W.2d at 562. 
185 /d. 
186 /d. 
187 /d. at 562-{)3. 
188 /d. at 562. 
189 /d. 
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and Keiser, the courts treated "tenure" and "continuous tenure" as synonymous terms. 190 Tenure 
is continuous; there is no such thing as non-continuous tenure. Therefore, the problem with the 
Sixth Circuit's reasoning is that Cooley had already granted Branham tenure. Thus, by granting 
Branham "tenure," Cooley granted Branham "continuous tenure," and the issue as to whether the 
school was obligated to grant continuous tenure or not disappears. 
In order for the Sixth Circuit to correctly interpret the scope of the protections afforded to 
Branham by her tenure status, the court should have accepted the definition of tenure in the 1940 
Statement as the definition of Branham's tenure. The court should have accepted the 1940 
Statement definition because no other clear definition of tenure existed in the employment 
contract or in Cooley's bylaws. 191 Thereafter, the court should have read the 1940 Statement as a 
policy that granted any tenured professor permanent or continuous employment because the 1940 
Statement defined tenure as a means for economic security and outlined the substantive and 
procedural rights of tenured professors. 192 
The court should have held that, while the employment contract was a method for the 
school to set up a contract for payment to the professor, the professor's tenure ultimately 
controlled her employment status. In a contractual sense, the court should have viewed tenure as 
a type of option-where the school is bound to employ the tenured professor if she decides to 
come back year after year unless there is adequate cause for termination, but where the professor 
is free to leave after any year without any binding obligation to the school. As long as the 
professor has achieved tenure status, defined in the school's bylaws, the designated length of the 
professor's most recent employment contract should not govern the length of time that the school 
190 See Keiser v. State Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 630 P.2d 194 (Mont. 1981); Collins v. Parsons Coli., 203 
N.W.2d. 594 (Iowa 1973); State ex rei. Richardson v. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. ofNev., 261 P.2d 515 (Nev. 1953). 
191 Branham, 689 F.3d at 562. 
192 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 51. 
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remains obligated to employ the professor. In this case, Branham's tenure status did afford her 
certain rights and protections not specified in her most recent employment contract, such as the 
right to continuous employment. 193 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRANHAM DECISION 
The Sixth Circuit's ruling in Branham will have adverse effects on the American 
professoriate and American education. The first problem for American professors is the 
interpretation of academic tenure. By ruling that a professor's tenure status does not afford that 
professor any rights or protections other than those specified in the professor's individual 
employment contract, the Sixth Circuit diminished the role of academic tenure. 194 As much as 
American higher education has changed in the past one hundred years, the main goal of tenure 
has remained the same: to protect academic freedom. This goal is still important and necessary. 
Any diminishment in the substantive rights afforded to professors with tenure status will result in 
a diminishment of the protection of academic freedom in American institutions of higher 
learning. Branham allows colleges and universities discretion to grant professors "tenure" 
without also granting them the rights and protections that traditionally accompany tenure. 195 
Following the Branham decision, institutions will be able to please professors by granting them 
"tenure" while circumventing the protections that should accompany the professors' tenure status 
by: (I) not defining any specific tenure rights in professors' employment contracts and (2) 
having a vague tenure policy that allows for a broad interpretation of whether tenure actually 
means continuous employment or not. Cooley managed to achieve just this in Branham. If this 
ruling stands, the protections of academic tenure will wane, as employment security for 
193 As mentioned supra, Cooley most likely had adequate cause to dismiss Branham; but the court's ruling will 
allow schools to dismiss tenured professors without cause at the expiration of their employment contracts. See text 
accompanying note 163. 
194 Branham, 689 F.3d at 563. 
195 ld. 
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professors will only exist in their current employment contracts. Essentially, "tenure" will 
become a hollow title, rendering it a meaningless badge of seniority. 
The diminishment of academic freedom that will result from the destruction of the 
traditional academic tenure doctrine will have the most adverse effect on American education 
because professors will no longer have the continuous job security that allows them to introduce 
innovative thought into the classroom without fear of dismissal. An educational system that 
makes it difficult to penalize a speaker reinforces the speaker's academic freedom. 196 
Meanwhile, a restraint on academic freedom leads to a restraint on progressive thought. 197 
Tenure as job security and tenure as academic freedom are linked such that the latter cannot truly 
exist without the former. The reason why tenure provides extra job security to professors is 
because it provides a means to academic freedom. 198 The concept of lehrfreiheit will no longer 
exist in American education if school administrations are not required to adhere to certain tenure 
standards and can control all employment protection through the professor's employment 
contract. Professors might revert to the traditional teaching styles for fear of losing their jobs if 
they promote too much non-traditional thinking. 199 The suppression of creative thought that 
spurred the creation of the AAUP will increase as the protections afforded by academic tenure 
decrease. 200 
The ruling m Branham will also incentivize professors to seek more contractual 
protections instead of the previously guaranteed protections of tenure. This will mean that 
seasoned professors will constantly have their next contract agreement in mind when planning on 
196 Brown & Kurland, supra note 131, at 329. 
197 See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 330. Van Alstyne argues that one of the main functions of tenure is "to 
maximize the freedom of the professional scholar and teacher to benefit society through the innovation and 
dissemination of perspectives and discoveries aided by investigations, without fear that he must accommodate his 
honest perspectives to the conventional wisdom." !d. 
198 !d. 
199 See METZGER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 10, at 4-5. 
200 See id. at 194. 
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what materials to teach and how to teach them, especially if schools choose to hire them using 
one-year contracts. Instead of teaching and researching in a comfortable and protected 
enviromnent, professors will be pressured to prove their short-term worth. Tenure is a long-term 
commitment that promotes long-term intellectual growth. The temporal restraints that come with 
employment contracts will impede that intellectual growth. 
One potential solution to the problem in Branham is for institutions to clearly define their 
tenure policies in both their bylaws and employment contracts. The bylaws should expressly 
state that the school has a tenure system (as required by the ABA),201 and then elaborate on what 
substantive and procedural protections tenure status gives tenured professors.202 Professors' 
employment contracts should also state that the professor is a tenured professor and expressly 
incorporate the tenure policies of the school (which should be clear and unambiguous) in order to 
eliminate any confusion as to what tenure means or the rights of the tenured professor. If 
institutions of higher learning take these steps, issues such as the one in Branham may never 
reach judicial review. Cooley's unclear polices and employment contracts allowed the Sixth 
Circuit to enter an unnecessary analysis on tenure.203 The result of that analysis now threatens to 
alter and restrict American tenure doctrine. 
Cooley's administrators have already recognized the law school's victory as a gateway to 
impose more restrictions on tenured faculty members. 204 In a statement released after the Sixth 
Circuit's decision, James Robb, Cooley's Associate Dean for Development and Alumni 
Relations, stated that, "[t]he Sixth Circuit's decision is very important to institutions of higher 
201 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 32. 
202 See. e.g., 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 51, at 4 ("After the expiration of a probationary period, 
teachers or investigators should have permanent or continuous tenure, and their service should be terminated only 
for adequate cause, except in the case of retirement for age, or under extraordinary circumstances because of 
financial exigencies."). 
203 Branham, 689 F.3d 558. 
204 See US. Court of Appeals Finds in Favor of Cooley Law School, THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCH. (Aug. 6 2012), 
http://www .cooley .edu/news/20 12/us _court_ of_ appeals_ finds _in_ favor_ of_ cooley _law_ school.html. 
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learning because it confirms that 'tenure' is a contractual concept which takes its meaning only 
from the language of the particular employment contract and from nothing else. The word 
'tenure' itself adds no gloss."205 But nowhere in the AAUP regulations, the ABA regulations, or 
the in the historical evolution of tenure in the United States has tenure been treated as primarily a 
contractual concept.206 It has been treated as exactly the opposite-a concept that lies outside the 
restrictions of normal employment standards and security.207 The judiciary needs to protect this 
concept of tenure in order to ensure that academic freedom continues to thrive in American 
II d . ··208 co eges an umversi!ies. Contrariwise, the Sixth Circuit's ruling weakens the economic 
security provided by academic tenure and, in turn, endangers academic freedom. 
V. CONTEMPORARY THOUGHTS ON ACADEMIC TENURE 
The use of the tenure-track system in American colleges and universities has its critics 
and its supporters. The anti-tenure community fears that tenure provides too much job security 
to professors and allows professors to slip into a pattern of mediocrity without fear of 
dismissal.209 The pro-tenure base shares the views of this Comment-that academic tenure 
protects academic freedom, which promotes progressive and creative thought in the 
classroom.210 In recent years, the anti-tenure camp has gained some traction, and the Branham 
decision will undoubtedly add to that momentum. 
The ABA has also started showing some signs of moving away from its tenure policy. In 
20 I 0 a special committee of the ABA proposed a revision to its guidelines on academic 
205 !d. 
206 See PART II supra. 
207 Jd 
208 See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 330. 
209 For articles that highlight or explain the negative effects of tenure systems in higher education see Fishman, 
su!Jra note 19; Dickinson, supra note 23, at 341-43; Brown & Kurland, supra note 196, at 331-33. 
21 See generally Brown & Kurland, supra note 196; Van Alstyne, supra note 2. 
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freedom.2ll In the revision, the committee proposed to remove Standard 405, which requires all 
schools to establish a tenure policy?12 The committee characterized the change in the standards 
as a way to minimize "intrusive mandates" on schools seeking accreditation, and urged that 
schools should still protect academic freedom. 213 Many law school professors around the 
country have vehemently opposed this proposal.214 The professors specifically oppose the 
proposal because it came only a few weeks after multiple groups issued lengthy statements in 
favor of preserving the existing protections.215 As of the 2012-2013 ABA standards, there has 
been no change to the ABA's tenure policy.216 
Apart from the ABA, an increasing belief exists among American colleges and 
universities that that the education system would be better without tenure.217 Many institutions 
are moving towards hiring faculty members with long-term contracts instead of implementing a 
tenure-track system. 218 In a survey by The Chronicle of Higher Education, less than a quarter of 
college presidents preferred full-time tenured professors to faculty working under long-term or 
annual contracts.219 Proponents of long-term contracts for professors argue that tenure's 
protections make it too difficult to get rid of incompetent faculty and can promote a culture of 
complacency among tenured professors.220 One critic of tenure has even posited that academic 
tenure has lead to a dearth of practical legal training in law schools. 221 
211 Scott Jaschik, Law school professors' tenure in danger?, USA TODAY July 26, 2010, 
http://www. usatoday.com/news/education/20 I 0-07-26-ihe-law-tenure N .htm. 
212 Id -
213 Id 
214 ld 
21s Id 
216 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 70. 
217 Jack Stripling, Most Presidents Prefer No Tenure for Majority of Faculty, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 
15, 2011), http:l/chronicle.com/article/Most-Presidents-Favor-No/127526/. 
218 !d. 
219 !d. 
220 !d. 
221 See Gregory M. Dickinson, Academic Tenure and the Divide between Legal Academia and Legal Practice, 6 
DARTMOUTH L.J. 329 (2008). 
32 
Although there has been a movement to remove tenure from higher education, there are 
still many defenders of the traditional concept of tenure. Law Professor William Van Alstyne 
believes that tenure's function as a protection for academic freedom provides more benefit than 
harm.222 Van Alstyne states, "[a]n individual who is subject to termination without showing of 
professional irresponsibility, irrespective of the long term of his service within his discipline, 
will to that extent hesitate publicly to expose his own perspectives and take from all of us that 
which we might more usefully confront and consider."223 Therefore, at the risk of giving tenure 
to professors who may become complacent, an institution may force its professors to withhold 
progressive thought in the classroom?24 The occasional "deadwood" scholar, who becomes 
complacent but does not function so poorly as to warrant removal may exist, but this is the 
exception not the rule. 225 Surveys show that tenured professors publish more, teach more, and 
serve on more committees than untenured professors?26 Tenured professors also tend to do a 
large amount of research in their field, allowing them to educate their students on the latest 
academic works and breakthroughs.227 Additionally, when institutions enforce their tenure 
policies properly, they will dismiss poor professors when there is adequate cause.228 
Contrary to what many tenure opponents believe, tenure is essential to prevent decline in 
quality amongst the professoriate. Tenure promotes efficiency by diminishing uncertainty 
regarding job security.229 Tenure also promotes what Henry Rosovsky labeled the "social 
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contract" of tenure.230 The "social contract" of tenure includes the assurance that one can work 
without interference, that one belongs to a select company of educated men and women, and that 
one can grow old without the fear of being pushed out of one's job.231 This concept is what 
creates a favorable climate for academic freedom.232 Tenure also creates a business pattern 
called hands-tying.233 A university ties its hands so that it cannot renege just because the 
appointment of a particular faculty member was not as fruitful as the administration expected.Z34 
This promotes better selection methods and hiring efficiency by institutions of higher leaming.235 
In the long run, institutions should benefit from this method because smart, able scholars will 
join those institutions due to the opportunity to teach at a high level with good job security.236 
Tenure provides its own protection from poor professors because as difficult as it is to remove a 
tenured professor, it is just as difficult to become a tenured professor. Nationally about two 
percent of tenured faculty members are dismissed each year. 237 Meanwhile, the average 
probationary period for a professor at a four-year school is seven years.238 This is a time of 
evaluation, during which most schools can choose not to renew the professor's appointment, or 
dismiss the professor without cause239 
The Sixth Circuit's ruling in Branham promotes the movement towards long-term 
contract agreements for professors in place of tenure status. It offers legal support for the power 
of the employment contract over the power of the generally accepted concept of academic 
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tenure. The problem with long-term contracts is that the protections that professors would 
normally have under tenure will only exist during the term of the contract and will disappear at 
the end of the term. This is exactly how the probationary period for tenure works now. The only 
difference is that probationary professors receive short-term contracts instead of long-term 
contracts. 240 At the end of a contract the professor loses the substantive and procedural rights 
that would have been afforded to him for life if he was a tenured professor. Tenure's critics may 
perceive the Branham ruling as a victory for American colleges and universities, and a loss for 
the professoriate, but this is a loss for both sides because the positive aspects of academic tenure 
far outweigh the negative. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The founders of academic tenure in American higher education created tenure in order to 
ensure academic freedom. They felt the oppression of an antiquated, authoritarian educational 
tradition that stifled progressive thought, and instilled fear in those who chanced to speak out 
against it. The first step to protect academic freedom was to offer job security to the 
professoriate. The first step to the destruction of academic freedom will be to eliminate that job 
security. The Branham court erred in its ruling because it ruled that Branham's tenure did not 
afford her rights beyond those specified in her most recent employment contract. That ruling 
offered a huge blow to the job security that tenure status afforded tenured professors. According 
to the Sixth Circuit, the substantive protections of tenure no longer exist unless they are 
specifically enumerated in each professor's current employment contract. The proper 
interpretation should have been that once Branham accepted her position as a tenured professor, 
she was entitled to continuous employment notwithstanding her annual employment contracts. 
Cooley may have been justified in dismissing Branham for adequate cause, but that does not 
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change the validity of her tenure status regarding the specific rights enumerated in her most 
recent employment contract. This interpretation is important because it protects professors' 
tenure status and protects the vital rights that tenured professors receive: continuous employment 
and academic freedom. If left unchanged, the Branham decision will lead to the deterioration of 
tenure and the deterioration of academic freedom. The Sixth Circuit's weakening of academic 
tenure rights will result in the dissipation of tenure track systems in American institutions due to 
the inability of tenure to serve its main purpose to the professors. Professors will seek long-term 
contracts in order to ensure job stability, and true academic freedom-the ability to teach without 
fear of dismissal for teaching style or innovative classroom material-will no longer exist. This 
is a step in the wrong direction for American higher education. The effect that the Branham 
decision is the gateway to the erosion of academic freedom and must be overturned. 
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